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INTRODUCTION:
LEGISLATIVE PROPOSALS TO RESTRICT THE
JURISDICTION OF THE FEDERAL COURTS: ARE
THEY WISE? ARE THEY CONSTITUTIONAL?
DOLORES

K. SLOVITRt

T HE

SUBJECT which this Symposium addresses is among the
most controversial and yet significant issues of our decade.
There are currently pending in Congress some twenty bills which
would restrict the jurisdiction of the federal courts. Some of these
are addressed to restricting the jurisdiction of the lower federal
courts, particularly in regard to specific remedies, while others are
addressed to restricting the appellate jurisdiction of the United
States Supreme Court in certain specific types of cases or controversies.
The Board of Editors of the Villanova Law Review invited a
distinguished panel of legal scholars, representing the continuum
of thought on the subject, to present papers and discuss the issue in
a panel discussion. In this introduction to the publication of that
Symposium, I will endeavor to call attention to some of the major
questions raised by jurisdiction restricting legislation and present
the constitutional background for discussion of the issue.
In considering the six articles and the Symposium Proceedings
which follow, it is necessary to keep in mind the scheme which the
United States Constitution provides for the exercise of the judicial
power. Article III, section 1 provides that "[t]he judicial Power
of the United States, shall be vested in one supreme Court, and in
such inferior Courts as the Congress may from time to time ordain
and establish."' In contrast, Article III, section 2 provides:
The judicial Power shall extend to all Cases, in Law
and Equity, arising under this Constitution, the Laws
of the United States, and Treaties made, or which shall be
made, under their Authority;-to all Cases affecting
Ambassadors, other public Ministers and Consuls;-to all
Cases of admirality and maritime Jurisdiction;-to Con-

t United States Circuit Judge, United States Court of Appeals for the
Third Circuit.
1. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 1.

(895)
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troversies to which the United States shall be a Party; to
Controversies between two or more States;-between a
State and Citizens of another State;-between citizens of
different States,-between Citizens of the same State claiming Lands under Grants of different States, and between a
State, or the Citizens thereof, and foreign States, Citizens
or Subjects.
In all Cases affecting Ambassadors, other public Ministers and Consuls, and those in which a State shall be
Party, the supreme Court shall have original Jurisdiction.
In all the other Cases before mentioned, the supreme
Court shall have appellate Jurisdiction, both as to Law
and Fact, with such Exceptions, 2and under such Regulations as the Congress shall make.
In the dispute over the current pending legislation, some very
fundamental propositions may be overlooked, possibly because they
are obvious. It may nonetheless be useful to begin the discussion
with some black letter propositions.
I do not think that anyone questions or debates the proposition that article III, section 1 gives Congress the power to
impose fundamental revisions on the jurisdiction of the inferior
federal courts. If tomorrow Congress chose to enact a statute that
withdrew from the lower federal courts jurisdiction over diversity
cases,3 there might be some scholarly debate over the wisdom of
such action, but not over congressional power. Similarly, if Congress chose by legislation to expand diversity jurisdiction of the
federal courts by legislatively overriding the rule of "complete
diversity" enunciated in Strawbridge v. Curtiss 4 and sought instead
to define diversity as embracing minimal diversity, there would be
2. Id. §2.
3. 28 U.S.C. § 1332 provides in pertinent part:
(a) The district courts shall have original jurisdiction of all civil actions
where the matter in controversy exceeds the sum or value of $10,000,
exclusive of interests and costs, and is between(1) citizens of different States;
(2) citizens of a State and citizens or subjects of a foreign state;
(3) citizens of different States and in which citizens or subjects of a
foreign state are additional parties; and
(4) a foreign state . . . as plaintiff and citizens of a State or different

States.
Id.
4. 7 U.S. (3 Cranch) 267 (1806) (where citizens of the same state appeared
on both sides of a dispute, diversity jurisdiction was denied).
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no question that Congress had acted within its constitutional grant
of power. 5 Congress has periodically decreased the diversity jurisdiction of the inferior federal courts by adjustment of the amount
in controversy 6 without evoking either dismay or alarm. The
power to establish inferior federal courts encompasses as well the
7
power to define their jurisdiction once they have been established.
Congressional power with respect to jurisdiction of the inferior
federal courts also patently includes power to distribute or redistribute business among the various federal districts or circuits.8
For example, the current pending bills which would enable a shift
of venue in cases in which the United States is a party, and in
appeals of regulatory agency decisions, which appear to be aimed
primarily toward restricting the scope of decisions of the United
States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia, have not been
challenged on the ground that such legislation would exceed Congress' power. Plainly it would not.
On the other hand, what is at issue in the pending legislation
is the legislative attempt to restrict jurisdiction of both the inferior
federal courts and the appellate jurisdiction of the Supreme Court
in constitutional matters. In large part, the dispute is generated
because it is apparent that congressional efforts to restrict jurisdiction are not neutral efforts, as is the restriction of diversity
jurisdiction, but instead are efforts designed to manipulate the
substantive outcome of controversial issues. Numerous practical,
as well as constitutional, questions are raised by the type of legislation now pending in Congress. From a practical standpoint, the
restriction of jurisdiction of the lower federal courts in certain
categories of cases would necessarily result in such cases being de5. See State Farm Fire 8c Cas. Co. v. Tashire, 387 U.S. 523, 530-31 (1967)
("Article III poses no obstacle to the legislative extension of federal jurisdiction, founded in diversity, so long as any two adverse parties are not cocitizens").
6. See 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a) (1956), amended by 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a) (1958)
(the amount in controversy required for diversity jurisdiction increased from
$3,000 to $10,000).
7. See Sheldon v. Sill, 49 U.S. (8 How.) 441 (1850). Congress precluded
the lower federal courts from exercising jurisdiction in cases where an assignee
of a chose in action attempted to bring an action which his assignor could
not have brought. The assignor in this case was of the same citizenship as
the opposing party and, therefore, could not have maintained the action.
Thus, despite the fact that the assignee was a citizen of a different state, he
was also precluded from bringing the action due to lack of jurisdiction. Id.
at 449-50. See also Palmere v. United States, 411 U.S. 389, 401 n.9 (1973).
8. See, e.g., 28 U.S.C. § 1404 (1976) (transfer of a civil action to another
district permitted for the convenience of parties and witnesses); 28 U.S.C.
§41 (1976 & Supp. 1981) (creating the Court of Appeals for the Eleventh
Circuit by severing part of the Fifth Circuit).
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cided, in the first instance, by the various state courts. Because
there is a high probability of diverse interpretations of issues of
federal constitutional significance by state supreme courts, the
United States Supreme Court, with the sole opportunity and responsibility for definitive resolution, would undoubtedly be greatly
overburdened. It was this concern which led Congress in 1875 to
vest jurisdiction over federal questions in the lower federal courts.9
The opposite problem would be presented if the appellate jurisdiction of the Supreme Court were restricted. Then the problem
would not be one of overburden, but rather the nonreconcilable
nonuniformity of constitutional interpretation which would inevitably result when fifty state supreme courts were given the opportunity to make diverse decisions on the same provisions of the
federal Constitution. Imagine the plight of federal officers, such
as the Attorney General of the United States, who may be subject
to inconsistent obligations. Because neither of these scenarios are
politically palatable, it may be that ultimately, as with many issues
in a democratic society, practical considerations, rather than those of
principle, will lead to a resolution and avoid a constitutional crisis.
This Symposium, however, addresses power, not politics. Obviously, if the precedent were conclusive on the power of Congress
to enact legislation restricting the appellate jurisdiction of the
Supreme Court, this Symposium would have been convened on
another topic. As the various participants suggest, the precedent is
inconclusive and is cited as support by those with opposing viewpoints. Although the number of pending bills to restrict the
Supreme Court's jurisdiction, and the apparent support which they
have engendered, may appear to be unique, in fact there have been
prior efforts to affect outcome determinations by manipulation of
jurisdiction, and not all have failed. Perhaps the leading example
of such an instance is the provision restricting the jurisdiction of
the federal courts to issue injunctions "in any case involving or
growing out of a labor dispute" except under certain defined circumstances.1 0 The Court had little difficulty in sustaining "the
power of Congress . . . to define and limit the jurisdiction of the

inferior courts of the United States," 21 although it would indeed be
myopic to believe that the impetus behind the restriction of jurisdiction was a neutral effort to regulate the business of the courts.
9. 8 C. WARREN, THE SUPREME COURT IN UNITED STATES HISTORY 402
(1922).

10. Norris LaGuardia Act, 29 U.S.C. § 107 (1976).
11. Lauf v. E.G. Skinner & Co., 303 U.S. 323, 330 (1938), citing Kline v.
Burke Constr. Co., 260 U.S. 226, 233-34 (1922).
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However, the principal distinction between provisions such as the
anti-injunction section of the Norris LaGuardia Act and the pending bills is that the Norris LaGuardia Act merely restricted use of
an injunctive remedy in a situation where no constitutional right
12
was implicated.
In addition to the effect of the current bills on the ability of
the federal courts to vindicate constitutional rights, another serious
concern is that Congress is attempting to use its article III power
to define the jurisdiction of the federal courts in order to make
changes in substantive constitutional law which the constitution
envisions as the function of the amendment process. Thus, the
question is whether a simple legislative majority can override the
purposefully time-consuming and cumbersome amendment procedure which article V mandates. 3 Indeed, in August 1981 the
American Bar Association's House of Delegates, voted almost unanimously to oppose congressional efforts to bypass the amendment
14
process by simple legislation.
I hope to have performed the simple function of an appetizer
at a great feast-to whet your appetite for the delights which
follow.
12. See 29 U.S.C. § 107 (1970).
13. U.S. CONsT. art. V. Article V provides in pertinent part:
The Congress, whenever two thirds of both Houses shall deem
it necessary, shall propose Amendments to this Constitution, or on
the application of the Legislatures of two thirds of the several States,
shall call a Convention for proposing Amendments, which, in either
case, shall be valid to all Intents and Purposes, as Part of this Constitution, when ratified by the Legislatures of three fourths of the
several States, or by Conventions in three fourths thereof, . .
Id.
14. See Meserve, Limiting Jurisdiction and Remedies of Federal Courts,

68 A.B.A.J. 159 (1982).
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